Abstract. We introduce a new centrist or intermediate inequality concept, between the usual relative and absolute notions, which is shown to be a variant of the -ray invariant inequality measures in P®ngsten and Seidl (1997) . We say that distributions x and y have the same xY p-inequality if the total income di¨erence between them is allocated among the individuals as follows: 100p% preserving income shares in x, and 1001 À p% in equal absolute amounts. This notion can be made as operational as current standard methods in Shorrocks (1983) .
I. Introduction
Most welfare analysis implicitly assume that social or aggregate welfare can be expressed in terms of only two features of the income distribution: the mean, and a notion of vertical inequality. In this context, we are often interested in evaluation methods which require the minimum possible number of value judgments. In particular, we are interested in unambiguous (although incomplete) rankings according to which social welfare increases only if e½-ciency and distribution both improve. Dutta and Esteban (1991) show that for this procedure to be justi®ed, among other things we need to specify the type of mean-invariance property 1 we want our inequality indices to satisfy (see also Ebert 1987; Weinhardt 1993) . Starting from a given income distribution x, two polar cases have been extensively studied so far: a preference for e½ciency along rays through x from the origin, maintaining constant a relative notion of inequality; and a preference for e½ciency along rays through x parallel to the line of equality, maintaining constant an absolute notion of inequality. The merit of Shorrocks's (1983) contribution is that he develops operational methods to ®nd out whether one distribution is unambiguously better than another according to all SEFs in wide classes of admissible functions in the relative and the absolute case (for the absolute case, see also Moyes 1987) .
In Del Rõ Âo and Ruiz-Castillo (1996) we have found with this methodology that the 1990 1991 income distribution has less relative inequality but more absolute inequality than the 1980 1981 comparable distribution1. The following empirical question cannot be answered with present tools: is the 1990 1991 distribution``barely better'' than the 1980 1981 distribution from the relative point of view, and consequently``far away'' from it from the absolute one; or is``so much better'' from the relative perspective that is``nearly equivalent'' to it from the absolute point of view?
To approach this question, we suggest to consider the space of``centrist'' or intermediate views on inequality, between the``rightist'' (relative) or``leftist'' (absolute) cases in Kolm (1976a, b) 's value laden terminology. Informally, in the situation of the example we are interested in knowing how far we can go to the left of the political spectrum within the centrist space, and still claim that the 1990 1991 distribution is less unequal than the 1980 1981 distribution.
To develop this idea we must start by specifying an appropriate notion of intermediate inequality. One possibility is to use Kolm's (1976a, b) suggestion or the single parameter m-inequality concept proposed by Bossert and P®ngs-ten (1990) . Unfortunately, as pointed out by P®ngsten and Seidl (1997) (or PS for short), both share a serious disadvantage: they approach the rightist position when aggregate income rises, even if the income distribution becomes more unequal according to some inequality measure2.
Another possibility is to use the ray-invariance concept suggested by PS, which gives rise to a wide class of -invariant inequality measures free from this¯aw. In this paper we introduce a new class of inequality measures which is a subset of the -invariant class. We call it xY p-inequality to stress the dependence on an initial income distribution x, as well as on a parameter value p in the unit interval. Like all other notions, it builds upon a monotonicity property conveying the proper division of extra income to leave inequality intact. We say that x and y have the same xY p-inequality if the total income di¨erence between the two distributions is allocated among the indi-1 Except for Portugal, who has gone through similar political and economic reforms since the mid 1970's, this is a di¨erent trend from most OECD countries. For Portugal (see Gouveia and Tavares 1995, Rodrigues 1993) , and for the international experience (see, for instance, Atkinson et al. 1995, Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997) . 2 For other shortcomings of Kolm's (1976) approach (see Bossert and P®gsten 1990). viduals as follows: p100% preserving income shares in x, and 1 À p100% in equal absolute amounts.
Our reason for defending the new notion is twofold. It has a clear normative interpretation, and it can be made operational in the following way. Given an initial distribution x and a value of p, we develop empirical methods to test whether any distribution y has greater social welfare than x according to all SEFs in a class characterized by the usual assumptions plus a monotonicity property compatible with the xY p-inequality concept. Suppose now we want to analyze the Spanish situation during the 1980's, an interesting period in which a socialist party occupied power by democratic means for the ®rst time in 40 years. The problem is that we do not have any a priori reasons to determine which centrist attitudes, or which range of p values, we should adopt to compare the two distributions. Our strategy is to allow the data to reveal this for us: we estimate the range of p values for which the 1990 1991 distribution is non comparable to the 1980 1981 distribution. In this way, we learn for what type of centrist attitudes there has been a reduction or an increase (to the``right'' or the``left'' of that range of p values, respectively) in inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section II presents our notion of intermediate inequality within the larger class of -ray invariant inequality measures proposed by PS. Following up on ideas put forth in Chakravarty (1988) , Sect. III describes how our measure can be made operational by using Lorenz comparisons. Section IV concludes. Proofs are included in an Appendix. Any real valued function I de®ned on D satisfying continuity, S-convexity and population replication invariance is called an income inequality measure. I X satis®es scale invariance when I x I lx for all x A D and for all l b 0. I X satis®es translation invariance when I x I x h1 for all x A D and for all h A R such that x h1 A D. If an inequality measure satis®es scale or translation invariance it is called a relative or an absolute inequality measure, respectively.
II. Ray invariant inequality concepts
II.1. Notation Let x x 1 Y F F F Y x H A R H Y 2 U H`y, denote an income distribution with x 1 U x 2 U F F F U x H . Then D
II.2. Centrist inequality attitudes
It appears to be the case that, for technical or other reasons, the vast majority of specialists prefer the relative notion. However, ®rst Dalton (1920) and later Kolm (1976a, b) As pointed out in PS, a centrist income inequality attitude can be modeled in various ways. For all x A D, there exists a set of income distributions Ex such that, ®rst, all y A Ex are perceived to be as equally distributed as x, second, for lx b x and x h1 b x all y A Ex are perceived to be more equally distributed than lx and less equally distributed than x h1, and third, for x b lx and x b x h1 all y A Ex are perceived to be less equally distributed than lx and more equally distributed than x h1. Given such a centrist inequality attitude, the question arises whether there are E-invariant income inequality measures, i.e., inequality measures I X such that I x I y for all y A Ex.
As PS indicate, a straightforward case is to assume Ex to be composed of rays through x4. For any A S, the set E x of -rays through x is de®ned by
In accordance with centrist ideas, PS require -rays to be restricted in two ways: ®rst, they Lorenz dominate the original distribution; and, second, they are more unequally distributed than translation invariance would require. Thus, given an income distribution x A D, de®ne the set x of value judgments (in income share form) which provide a reduction in relative inequality but an increase in absolute inequality relative to x:
In other words, given x A D and A x, every y A E x is derived from x by superimposing a``more equal'' income distribution according to the Lorenz criterion.
To understand in which sense x and co-determine the domain of -ray invariant functions, de®ne the set q of income distributions for which A S can represent a centrist inequality attitude:
Clearly, if x A D and A S but B x or x B q, then the pair xY does not give rise to a centrist inequality relation. Accordingly, a real valued function F X D 3 R is called -ray invariant in q, if and only if for each x A q,
Given an -ray invariant function I X , we say that it is an -ray invariant inequality measure if, in addition, it is continuos, S-convex and satis®es the population replication axiom.
In general, -ray invariance requires an inequality measure not to change provided any income change is distributed according to the value judgment represented by the relative pattern . Thus, let x 200Y 800, so that v x 0X2Y 0X8, and, for example, let 0X4Y 0X6 so that eLLv x . Then E x fy A R 2 X y 200Y 800 t0X4Y 0X6Y t A RgX Therefore, if we have 100 units of extra income to allocate, to preserve suchray invariance we must add up the vector 40Y 60 to x to reach 240Y 860.
II.3. A new concept of intermediate inequality
In principle, given two distributions xY y A D, we could search for t Ã and Ã so that y is Ã -ray invariant inequality equivalent to x , that is, y x t Ã Ã . In practice, t Ã is given by the total income di¨erence between the two distributions under comparison. In what follows, we assume without loss of generality that t Ã V 0. On the other hand, if the two distributions have the same number of individuals, we can always compute Ã u À tat Ã 5. The problem is that, in general, the Ã vector will not have a convenient interpretation. For instance, in the empirical illustration with Spanish data we would have a 24,000-dimensional Ã vector. It would be hard to interpret what is meant by people having more or less demanding inequality views than those represented by such Ã vector.
5 Otherwise, we can substitute the original distributions by their centiles, for example, and apply the previous expression.
We concentrate our attention on -ray invariant inequality measures which can receive a clear normative interpretation. For that purpose, we start from an initial income distribution x A D, and a value of p A 0Y 1. Then we consider rays through y A D constructed so that p100% of any extra income is allocated to individuals according to income shares in x, and 1 À p100% in equal absolute amounts. That is, we de®ne
Clearly, if we let pv x 1 À pe, then P xY p y E y. Correspondingly, we de®ne the subset q H of income distributions for which can represent a centrist inequality attitude in the following sense:
Clearly, for any x A q H Y Lv x . This means that q H H q. Then we say that a real valued function I xY p X D 3 R is a xY p-inequality measure in q H , if and only if it is the restriction to q H of the I -ray invariant inequality measure. In this case, of course,
Alternatively, we have that
In general, the set q H is clearly non-empty7, so that the xY p-inequality measures are well de®ned. This means that they enjoy all the properties discussed by PS for -ray invariant inequality measures.
If we let x 200Y 800 as before and p 0X5, then 50% of all income differences are allocated according to the income shares vector 1a5Y 4a5, and 50% in equal absolute amounts according to the proportions 1a2Y 1a2. Thus, the xY p-ray of income distributions through x is given by
Hence, 100 extra units of income are allocated as 35Y 65 to reach the new distribution 235Y 865 with the same xY p-inequality. Informally, we may say that a value of p 0X9 re¯ects a center-right attitude, while a value of p 0X4 re¯ects a center-left perception of inequality. The reason, of course, is that according to the ®rst view inequality is maintained if only 10% of any excess income is distributed according to the more demanding absolute criterion, while the second requires 60% to be allocated that way. On the other hand, 6 In the 2 dimensional case, all distributions y in q have the property that p H v y 1 p H e for some p H A 0Y 1. This means that q H and q coincide, in which case the xY p inequality and the ray invariant inequality concepts also coincide. In general, of course, the set q is much richer than q H .
7 Similarly, the subset H x of x, de®ned by H x f A S X p H v x 1 p H e for some p H A 0Y 1g, is also non empty.
notice that if p 1Y xY p-inequality becomes the relative view, whereas p 0 leads to the absolute view. The dependence of centrist or intermediate inequality measures on an initial situation deserves to be emphasized. Some readers may ®nd this a disadvantage because a certain value judgment is not applicable in all situations. However, we agree with PS when they assert that``. . . this is indeed an attractive feature . . . The meaning of``centrist'' need not be decided universally, but can be made contingent on the situations we know and hence can evaluate well''. Nevertheless, the way -inequality and xY p-inequality depend on the initial situation present some subtle di¨erences worth being discussed.
As we know, 0 A S and x A D can only give rise to a centrist inequality relation if x A q 0 and 0 A x. Given y A q 0 , if y A E 0 x then I 0 y I 0 x. Otherwise, i.e. if y B E 0 x, then we can only say that x and y do not have the same 0 -inequality. In our case, given x 0 A D and p 0 A 0Y 1Y 0 p 0 v x 0 1 À p 0 e is determined. Consider now two income distributions xY yq H 0 . Then there exists some pY p H A 0Y 1 such that 0 pv x 1 À pe and 0 p H v y 1 À p H e. This means that xY p-inequality and yY p Hinequality coincides with x 0 Y p 0 -inequality. The interpretation is clear: the same centrist attitude is captured when, starting from xY p100% of the income di¨erence between X and Y is allocated according to v x and 1 À p100% in equal absolute amounts, as when, starting from yY p H 100% of the income difference is allocated according to v y and 1 À p H 100% in equal absolute amounts. This can be understood as follows. Suppose ®rst that y A P xY p x, so that xY y have the same xY p-inequality. Then, as we show in Proposition 1.i, p H pX ta X pt. Assume without loss of generality that Y À X b 0. Then y has less relative inequality than x and p H b p. Thus, to get down to x from y so as to preserve intermediate inequality, we can follow the pattern v y more closely than the pattern v x from x; in other words, when we compare income distributions x and y from the viewpoint of the latter, the p H which ensures that I yY p H y I yY p H x is closer to 1 than p. On the other hand, if y B P xY p x, then we can only state that x and y do not have the same xY p-inequality but, according to Proposition 1. ii, p H V p whenever yLx. To appreciate the di¨erences between 0 -inequality and x 0 Y p 0 -inequality from a di¨erent perspective, suppose a situation in which x 1 and x 2 are the income distributions of country A in two moments of time, while y 1 and y 2 correspond to the same situation in country B. Given 0 , assume that x 1 and x 2 , as well as y 1 and y 2 , have the same 0 -inequality. In our case, given x 0 A D and p 0 A 0Y 1Y 0 p 0 v x0 1 À p 0 e is determined. Assume that both x 1 and x 2 , and y 1 and y 2 , have the same x 0 Y p 0 -inequality. 
(See the proof in the Appendix).
II.4. Social evaluation functions
A Social Evaluation Function (SEF for short) is a real valued function W de®ned on D, with the interpretation that for each income distribution xY W x provides the``social'' or, simply, the aggregate welfare from a normative point of view. We need to introduce a social preference for e½ciency consistent with the notion of intermediate inequality presented in Sect. II. 3. We ®rst say that a SEF W X D 3 R is monotonic along -rays in q, if and only if for each x A q
This property of monotonicity along -rays corresponds to a preference for higher incomes keeping -ray invariant inequality constant. Given x A D and p A 0Y 1, so that pv x 1 À pe, a SEF W X D 3 R is called monotonic along xY p-rays in q H , if and only if W ytpv x 1Àpe V W y for all scalars t V 0 and all y A q H X This property of monotonicity along xY p-rays corresponds to a preference for higher incomes keeping xY p-inequality constant. For any x A D and p A 0Y 1, let W xY p be the class of SEF satisfying continuity, population replication invariance, S-concavity and monotonicity along xY p-rays.
III. Operational methods
Let m X denote the income distribution mean. The following theorem, inspired in Chakravarty (1988) , summarizes the connection between Lorenz dominance and SEFs in the class W tY p in the homogeneous case. (See the proofs in the Appendix)
How do we apply these results in practice? Let t and u be the initial and the ®nal income distributions in a given country after a certain period of time. An empirical situation in which intermediate inequality concepts might prove useful, arises when u dominates t in the relative Lorenz sense but t dominates u in the absolute Lorenz sense. Given x 0 A D and p 0 A 0Y 1, suppose that society has centrist views according to which we should judge all income distributions from the point of view of x 0 Y p 0 -inequality. Assume without loss of generality that mu V mt. If we ®nd that
Otherwise, no intermediate welfare conclusion can be obtained.
The problem, of course, is that even if we simplify matters by selecting x 0 t, we do not have any a priori reasons to determine which should be the p 0 value. Our strategy is to use Theorem 1 to allow the data to reveal for which p values the income distributions u and t have the same tY p-inequality. If we are lucky, there will exist some p A 0Y 1 such that u t tpv t 1 À pe with t U À T. Otherwise, we may ®nd a pair of values in the unit interval, p 1 and p 2 , with p 1`p2 , such that
while for any p A p 1 Y p 2 , u and t are non comparable from the point of view of tY p-inequality.
A numerical example might be useful at this point. Assume that the data reveals that t and u are non comparable from the point of view of tY p-inequality for p's in the interval 0X4Y 0X7. Consider the center-right inequality views for which two distributions have the same inequality if, starting from t, 1 À 0X7100 30% or less of any excess income is distributed in absolute terms, and the remaining in relative terms. For all people with such views, in going from t to u inequality has decreased. For all people with center-left views, for which at least 1 À 0X4100 60% of excess income should be distributed in absolute terms for intermediate inequality to remain constant, in going from t to u inequality has increased.
Suppose now that for a di¨erent country in the same period, v and z have non comparable vY p-inequality for p's in the interval 0X5Y 0X6. We can say that, relative to the initial situation v, the spectrum of centrist attitudes for which there has been a reduction in inequality is larger. The same can be said of those attitudes for which there has been an increase in inequality. However, the spectrum of inequality views for which inequality cannot be compared has decreased. To appreciate the richness of our approach, notice that with present techniques we can only say that, in both countries, relative inequality decreased while absolute inequality increased. Notice also that to reach our conclusions we do not introduce any new value judgments. What we do is to allow the data to induce a useful partition in the space of centrist attitudes.
De®ne the absolute and the relative rays through tY At and Rt, by
At fx A D X x t teY t A Rg P tY 0 tY and Rt fx A D X x t tv t Y t A Rg P tY 1 tY respectively. Let us call a and r the income distributions in At and Rt, respectively, with mean mu. Since we assume that t U À T b 0, we have that a t te and r t tv t . De®ne the line segment faY rg in Hdimensional space by faY rg fz A D X z t tpv t 1 À pe for some p A 0Y 1g
This is the set consisting of all income distributions with mean equal to mu which can be reached by tY p-rays through t.
The General Case. Notice that the starting situation can be described by the fact that v a Lv u Lv r . Assume ®rst that the Lorenz dominance relation v a Lv u Lv r is strict. Then there must exist two values p 1 A 0Y 1 and p 2 A p 1 Y 1 which induce the following partition of faY rg:
The partition has the following property: v z Lv u for all z A faY z 1 gY v u Lv z for all z A fz 2 Y rg; and v u is either non comparable to v z for all z A fz 1 Y z 2 g. Since, for instance,
for every z A faY z 1 gY I tY p z I tY p t for some p A 0Y p 1 . Therefore, as we wanted:
Similarly,
It would be useful to provide a graphical illustration of the general case. In order not to interrupt the reading of the text, we present a 3-dimensional example in the Appendix.
Special cases.
If u A faY rg, then u t tpv t 1 À pe for some p A 0Y 1. Similarly, if there is some z A frY ag which is Lorenz equivalent to v u , then p 2 p 1 p with z t tpv t 1 À pe. In both cases I tY p u I tY p t. On the other hand, if v a is Lorenz equivalent to v u , then p 1 p 2 0; but if v a is non comparable to v u , then there exists no p 1 A 0Y 1. Similarly, if v u is Lorenz equivalent to v t , then p 1 p 2 1, while if v u is non comparable to v t , then there exists no p 2 A 0Y 1.
IV. Concluding remarks
Suppose we want to compare two income distributions u and t in two di¨erent moments of time, and assume that distribution u has a greater mean than t. If distribution u dominates t in the absolute Lorenz sense, then we believe there is a consensus that nothing else need to be done. Who would deny that there has been an unambiguous increase in social welfare? Only people who believe that to maintain inequality constant any excess income should be distributed so as to assign greater absolute amounts to the poor than to the rich.
Suppose, however, that distribution u dominates distribution t in the relative Lorenz sense, but that t dominates u in the absolute Lorenz sense. The main claim of this paper is that we can improve upon this type of evaluation without bringing in new value judgments. Conditional on a given income distribution x, we propose a continuum of inequality notions which can be intuitively ordered from the relative notion to the absolute one in terms of a parameter p which varies in the unit interval. Then we provide operational methods to partition such continuum of inequality notions into subsets with a clear normative interpretation.
For example, in the Spanish case during the 1980's we reach the following result for the total population and an intermediate value of the parameter 0X48. For a rather small set of center-right perceptions of inequality (according to which inequality remains constant if, say, 13% or less of any excess income is distributed in absolute amounts while the remaining is distributed according to the relative shares in the initial situation), inequality has decreased. For a second set of politically more demanding centrist attitudes (according to which inequality remains constant if approximately 29% or more of any excess income is distributed in absolute amounts), inequality has increased. For the remaining subset of centrist attitudes, inequality in 1990 1991 is equivalent, or statistically indistinguishable, to inequality in 1980 1981. We may take this result as implying that the decrease in inequality in Spain during this period has been``small''.
Whether social welfare went unambiguously down according to measurement instruments consistent with a relative inequality notion, is a very important piece of knowledge to have. However, in situations like the Spanish one, to know precisely under which set of centrist value judgments inequality has increased, decreased, or remained equivalent, generates some value added worth having. In our opinion, the methodology presented in this paper goes one step in the direction pointed out by Atkinson (1989) , when he indicates that we ought to follow procedures and, above all, report empirical estimates, making clear their dependence on the various axioms and value judgments involved.
Finally, what do we have to say if distribution u is dominated by t in the relative Lorenz sense? Again, we believe it is worth knowing whether distribution u's departure from the relative ray through t is``large'' or``small''. Think for simplicity in the two dimensional case. We know that the income share received by the poor in u has decreased. Assume, in addition, that the absolute amount of income received by the poor person in u has not decreased relative to t. Consider the set of income distributions in which any excess income is assigned to the rich person in t. They belong to what we may call the Paretian ray through t. Under the above assumptions, the distribution u lies somewhere between the Paretian ray and the relative ray through t. The question we are interested in can now be rephrased as follows: is the distribution u``very far'' apart from the relative ray through t, and therefore``close'' to the Paretian ray, re¯ecting a large increase in inequality? Del Rõ Âo (1996) extends the methods presented in this paper to provide an operative answer to this question.
with l X ptaX t X aX t1 À p p, which implies that l V p. Rearranging terms and substituting v x in 0 pv x 1 À pe we have To understand our approach, it su½ces to consider the set of income distributions z with mz mu 10 in which the individual rankings in t are preserved. This is the set in Fig. 1 with vertexes 0Y 0Y 30Y 10Y 10Y 10 and 0Y 15Y 15. The subset faY rg is the set of income distributions with mean equal to 10 which can be reached by tY p-rays through t. In particular, the income distribution that results from an equal allocation of the extra 27 income units is a 9X5Y 10Y 10X5, while the income distribution which preserves the income shares in t is r 5Y 10Y 15.
For any z A faY rg, there exists some p A 0Y 1 such that z t 27pv t 1 À pe. That is, every z A faY rg has been obtained from t by a meaningful economic procedure: allocating 1 À p100% of the extra 27 income units in equal absolute amounts among the three individuals, and the remaining p100% so as to maintain the income shares in t.
In the example, u B faY rg. However, the values p 1 0X33 and p 2 0X56 with the corresponding income distributions z 1 8Y 10Y 12 and z 2 7Y 10Y 13, induce a partition of faY rg with the property that zLu for all z A faY z 1 gY uLz for all z A fz 2 Y 1g, and u is Lorenz non comparable with z for all z A fz 1 Y z 2 g. The dark zone in Fig. 1 represents income distributions non comparable with income distribution u. Therefore, we conclude that in going from t to u income inequality has decreased for centrist attitudes according to Fig. 1 which 44% or less of all extra income should be allocated equally among all individuals, while it has increased for those according to which that percentage should be at least equal to 67%. For the remaining attitudes, t and u are non comparable from the point of view of tY p-inequality. One may say informally that the data have revealed that income inequality has been reduced by a considerable amount. Therefore, this cardinalization exercise has been carried out without the help of any new value judgments.
